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Abstract 
 
Across the western world there is today a search for new models of democratic 
governance. Central, regional and local institutions are redesigned. Public service 
systems are transforming into market-like organizations of service delivery and in 
many countries there is experimentation with user boards, customer choice, 
stakeholderism and other new forms of interaction between the public sector and the 
citizen. Meanwhile, democratic governance looks surprisingly much like the way it 
did 25 or 50 years ago. Political parties still largely monopolize citizens’ democratic 
input; elected officials are still held to account in quite traditional ways, and public 
administration still caters to such traditional objectives as legality, due process, and 
accountability. The paper reviews the transformation of governance from the vantage 
point of democratic values. The basic argument of the paper is that western 
democracies are currently implementing governance reform and administrative reform 
without much reflection of its democratic ramifications. The problem is exacerbated 
by the absence of any viable alternative model of democratic governance. Thus, while 
current reform undercuts the former role of political institutions and elective office, 
citizens and customers of public services are still left with traditional channels of 
representation and accountability. 
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The Chinese curse “may you live in interesting times” seems to have been cast on the 
politicians, bureaucrats and constitutional architects in Western Europe. During the past two 
decades, the political agenda has to some extent fallen out of control of the political and 
administrative elites. International terrorism, pandemics, recurrent financial instabilities, 
global warming and migration have reshuffled political priorities.  
Politics has also transformed itself. The neo-liberal political project that Mrs. 
Thatcher in the UK and Ronald Reagan in America set in train redefined the role of the state 
from a steering and intervening role towards a regulatory role, opening up for market-driven 
change. In the Anglo-American democracies and the Antipodes, with a large number of other 
countries following suit, neo-liberalism translated into New Public Management (henceforth 
NPM)-style administrative reform. In a similar spirit, the “new governance” became a 
catchword for reform during the 1990s, defining a new role for the state in society. The notion 
that the role of the state should be one of “steering, not rowing” (Osborne and Gaebler, 
1992:25) became an influential metaphor both for NPM reform and for the definition of the 
role of the state in the governance that was promoted during the 1990s. The key point in that 
discussion, as Stoker (1998) points out, is not so much about what government does but rather 
how it does it. 
Thus, the drivers of political change during the past twenty or so years have 
been both exogenous and endogenous to the political system. It is tempting to agree with 
those who suggest that the internal drivers of reform are institutional responses to the new 
external challenges facing the state (Sorensen, 2004). However, while that perspective 
certainly has merit, it probably underestimates the force and determination of the neo-liberal 
current across the western world during the 1980s and 1990s (Savoie, 1994). 
 State-society relationships have thus undergone considerable change, almost to 
the extent that the normative foundation of the state is challenged. Liberal democratic theory 
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emphasises a sharp distinction between state and society. With the emergent collaborative 
strategies in policy implementation and public service delivery that distinction becomes 
difficult to uphold, something which, in turn, has triggered a series of issues related to 
accountability and the exercise of political power. 
In the midst of all these changes, however, the representative system of 
government looks remarkably similar to what it did 25 or 50 years ago. Political parties still 
largely monopolize citizens’ democratic input. In Westminster systems as well as elsewhere 
the system of government still places cabinet ministers at the helm to be held to democratic 
account in case of political or bureaucratic malfeasance. That accountability rests on the 
Constitutional marriage between power and responsibility. However, given the profound 
changes in the process of governing and public service delivery—devolution, privatisation, 
agencification, management reform, new forms of collaborative strategies and contracting out, 
just to give a few examples (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2004; Pollitt and Talbot, 2003)—the 
classical notion of political accountability becomes almost untenable. Power and 
accountability have been divorced, if not de jure so de facto and we now need to assess what 
this means for democratic governance.  
NPM and governance reform have had profound repercussions on political 
leadership, both within the state and also in society at large. NPM emphasizes that the role of 
politicians in public service production should be to define long-term objectives and not to be 
engaged in day-to-day leadership which should be a task for autonomous managers. 
Governance reform, too, tends to downplay the role of political leadership by contextualizing 
the role of leaders in different collaborative arrangements. 
Yet, again, despite the decreasing political control over the new collaborative 
governance and NPM-reformed public services, politicians are still held to account through 
traditional, century-old processes. Those processes were designed on the assumption that 
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political leaders had sufficient control and overview to be in a position to take responsibility 
for actions and non-actions within their jurisdiction. In the NPM model of service delivery, 
reform advocates have brought forward a new model of accountability; “customers” of public 
services have been empowered to articulate their preferences and hold service providers to 
account in new channels by choosing among competing service providers. However, the issue 
of how to integrate the market-based accountability of public services with the traditional, 
institutional mechanisms of democratic accountability has not been resolved. Meanwhile, the 
traditional instruments of democratic control and accountability are of little help, too, since 
elected officials play a much less of a command and control role today than previously. 
This article reviews the transformation of governance from the vantage point of 
democratic values. It is focused on two aspects of this problem. First, how do traditional 
political and administrative institutions adapt to their new role in governance? What problems 
arise as institutions forge networks and partnerships with societal actors and pursue collective 
goals through such collaborative strategies? What challenges do the emergent models of 
governance pose to traditional representative institutions and to the bureaucracy? Since 
conventional democracy is a process of steering and accountability through political 
institutions, what problems will an institutional adaptation to new governance forms entail to 
traditional democracy? 
Secondly, to what extent can emergent, alternative governance arrangements 
provide transparency and democratic input and accountability? To what extent do market-
based models of service delivery, stakeholderism, network governance and other governance 
models offer an alternative to the traditional model of democratic and accountable 
government? To beg the question, as we reinvent governance, do we need to reinvent 
democracy as well? 
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Both of these sets of questions would obviously require a substantive research 
effort to be properly investigated. The main purpose of the paper is not to deliver an empirical 
analysis of that size and scope but rather to investigate how the institutional design of 
traditional and emergent governance models relate to the fundamental norms and values 
embedded in the conventional model of democratic government. The paper argues that most 
of the emergent governance models cater primarily to objectives related to efficiency and 
performance and less to the objectives of democracy and accountability. As a result, those 
models tend to create inequalities among different groups of citizens and disaggregate the 
polity. Despite extensive experimenting, the architects of reform have not figured out how to 
square the circle combining the institutional requirements of traditional democracy through 
elected officials with the requirements of flexibility and autonomy that lead to increased 
efficiency. Instead, accountability based on procedure is giving room for accountability based 
on performance, something that places traditional democratic institutions of accountability in 
an awkward position. “Governing without government” is essentially government without 
democracy as we know it. Indeed, the phrase “as we know it” is the focal point of this paper; 
are there contending or emergent models of democracy that can help solve the problem of the 
democratic deficit in the “governing without government” model? 
The article is organized as follows. The next section discusses the challenges the 
contemporary state faces in providing governance. That discussion is followed by an analysis 
of the institutional responses to those challenges. Then, the article assesses emergent 
alternative models of governance such as networks, stakeholder or user models and market-
based models of governance to see to what extent they provide sustainable alternatives to 
democratic governance. A concluding section closes the paper. 
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The challenges of governance 
 
The governance literature offers a wide variety of examples of the increasing of governance 
facing the modern state (Rhodes, 1997; Stoker, 1998; Pierre and Peters, 2000). Contemporary 
society is becoming increasingly complex and difficult to steer or control. Domestic markets 
and their actors are inserted into global markets—indeed, the domestic-global distinction is 
more and more difficult to make—which makes them both difficult and sensitive to regulate. 
The European states are deeply embedded in international collaboration of which the 
European Union is the most advanced case in history. Managing the contingencies, but also 
the opportunities, that the EU membership entails is in and of itself a source of major 
complexity (see, for instance, George, 2004). 
Furthermore, governments have faced a long-term problem with regard to 
revenues. During the 1990s, many countries experienced an economic downturn and growing 
discontent with taxes. The neo-liberal project defined tax cuts as one of its key objectives. 
Many governments have scored political points in that pursuit at the same time as the tax cuts 
confronted them with a different type of challenge; that of politically managing cutbacks.  
 Another set of challenges to governance is related to the decreasing level of 
popular trust in politicians, and less so in the institutions of government. In the western world, 
the typical pattern of allegiance and trust is that people trust institutions to a much higher 
degree than they trust politicians (Klingemann and Fuchs, 1995). Even so, however, a deep 
lack of trust in elected officials is a serious impediment to political leadership (Togeby, 2003). 
Also, some challenges to providing governance are self-inflicted. The policy capacity of the 
government, i.e. its capacity to retrieve and process information and produce effective policy, 
has been reduced and dispersed over the past 10-15 years (see Painter and Pierre, 2005). 
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Government departments today increasingly solicit policy advice from external sources such 
as think tanks and experts because the in-house expertise has been cutback or “outsourced”. 
Institutional reform such as devolving institutions and agencification has, in the 
reform vernacular of the 1990s and 2000s, probably increased the operative capacity of the 
state at the same time as it has created or exacerbated problems of horizontal coordination. 
The regional level of the political system has witnessed considerable institutional reform in 
almost all European countries during the past decade, partly in response to the EU structural 
funds. However, the trade off between ensuring democracy and accountability on the one 
hand and strengthening the operative capacity on the other hand is difficult to make, and, as 
Newman (2000:895) suggests, “nowhere is the feeling that the institutional mixture is about 
right”.  
The challenges to governance do not end at home, however. We mentioned 
earlier the continuing integration and consolidation of the EU as a set of challenges 
confronting its member states. In addition, the contemporary state is embedded in complex 
webs of international organizations, networks and single-issue commitments (“agendas”, 
“protocols”) that, taken together, pose a major challenge to its capacity to deliver governance. 
These international contingencies do not necessarily represent structures to which domestic 
politics must adapt but they certainly present a set of exogenous factors that must be 
considered in domestic policy making.  
The observant reader might object that many, if not most of these challenges are 
as old as government itself and that, by and large, governments have handled those challenges 
fairly successfully so far. The fact that some of these challenges are not new does not make 
them any less difficult to handle. Tax fatigue, cynicism with elected officials and a gap 
between popular expectations and what the state can deliver are probably perennial features of 
democratic government. Similarly, almost all states have had to deal with various 
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international contingencies throughout much of their existence. The novelty of the argument 
lies rather in the accumulated complexity of several of these governance challenges at once. 
The combination of international embeddedness and growing coordination problems in 
government, to give an example, creates a scenario in which a complex system is to handle 
complex situation. 
The concrete manifestation of these challenges to government as they provide 
governance varies, needless to say, among different national contexts owing to economic and 
political differences as well as to the degree of their international exposure. So does the 
political response to those challenges; some governments insist on maintaining control and 
attempt to introduce more obtrusive steering if traditional instruments fail. Other governments 
take social and international complexities as a token that they should not try to steer but 
instead play a more low-key, coordinating role. For instance, the responses to globalization 
has played out quite differently in different countries; some governments have adopted the 
policy that since globalization is beyond political control there is little point in trying to 
control it whereas others have questioned the (purportedly neo-liberal) globalization argument 
and stuck to traditional policy styles and measures (Weiss, 1998).  
 
A conspicuous institutional stability 
 
Despite the increasingly dynamic environment of the state and extensive institutional reform 
in the public bureaucracy, very little has happened in terms of constitutional reform. An 
almost idealized form of representative government remains the practiced model of 
representative democracy. Political representation overwhelmingly remains representation 
through political parties and political institutions, yet citizens perceive those institutions and 
their politicians with growing scepticism and mistrust (see, for instance, Togeby, 2003). To 
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some, these institutions are obsolete structures whose constitutional mandate and function 
have not been adapted to the social, political and bureaucratic realities of the 21st century. 
A related problem is that institutional reform has shifted control from 
representative towards executive institutions and weakened the link between those two types 
of institutions. Thus, today democratic input and accountability still rest with institutions 
whose effective control over the bureaucracy and the public service has been significantly 
reduced. Indeed, management reform tends to perceive those institutions as barriers to 
increasing efficiency and a customer-attuned public sector. Their control presupposes some 
degree of hierarchy, political allocation of resources and centralization, all of which is at odds 
with the keystones of NPM reform such as the separation of policy and operations, the 
empowerment of managers, the institutional devolution at the centre and the focus on 
performance. 
 That having been said, institutional continuity is not necessarily a bad thing, 
particularly in the case of institutions created to facilitate democratic governance. In order for 
state-society linkages to become institutionalized and recognized as legitimate, it is essential 
that there is some degree of permanency and continuity in order to facilitate social learning. 
Legitimacy and trust require time. Further along that avenue of thought, it might not be a 
good idea to conduct large-scale Constitutional reform to adapt the political system to every 
passing fad and trend in public management reform whose shelf life has been known to be 
rather short. There are also examples of such reform, not least in the management forerunner 
cases of Australia and New Zeeland, which seek to ameliorate the problem of political and 
democratic deficit by creating a more “integrated governance” (Halligan, forthcoming). All of 
this notwithstanding, the core of management reform does seem to be here to stay and so we 
need to assess how it fits with the conventional model of democratic government.  
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Institutions and governance in political analysis: towards a synthesis. The problem of 
understanding the challenge of governance to political institutions is a complex task both to 
practitioners and academics. The growing tension between the ideal-type model of 
representative government as defined by liberal democratic theory on the one hand and the 
current challenges to the state in terms of providing governance on the other is clearly 
reflected in political science analysis just as much as in contemporary reform. The past two 
decades have seen two significant, and seemingly conflicting, developments in political 
science. One is the strong focus institutions and their capacity to “shape and constrain” 
(Thelen and Steinmo, 1991:10) political behavior (for overviews, see Koelble, 1995; Remmer, 
1997). This “new institutionalism”, which can be traced back to the 1980s and the path 
breaking work by scholars such as James March and Johan P. Olsen (1984, 1989) and Peter 
Hall (1986), echoed Theda Skocpol’s argument that the state should be treated as “an actor 
whose independent efforts may need to be taken more seriously than heretofore in accounting 
for policy making and social change” (italics in original) (Skocpol, 1985:21). Thus, this group 
of scholars sent a powerful message that political institutions shape political preferences and 
action; they are causal factors in policy analysis; and they should be the first priority for 
anyone interested in explaining political and social behavior. 
 Real-world events would intervene, however. As Remmer (1997:52) noted in 
the late 1990s, "institutional approaches carving out a relatively autonomous causal role for 
political processes have risen to the forefront of political analysis precisely when economic 
constraints have drastically narrowed the range of feasible policy options". Economic 
downturn, coupled with the neo-liberal conviction that the state by its sheer size and 
interventions in fact caused many of the problems it tried to solve delivered a significant blow 
to institutional analysis. 
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Or did it? The other area of dramatically growing interest among political 
scientists during the 1990s and 2000s has been democratic governance (for overviews, see 
Kjaer, 2004; Pierre, 2000). This debate can be dated to the mid-1990s when Rod Rhodes first 
defined the “new governance” as “governing without government” (Rhodes, 1996) and later 
portrayed governance as “self-organizing inter-organizational networks characterized by 
interdependence, resource exchange, rules of the game and significant autonomy of the state” 
(Rhodes, 1997:15). 
At first glance, this perspective seemed to take issue with the institutionalists’ 
ideas about the sources of political power, and indeed about the nature of that power.i 
However, some scholars in the governance field argued that the changes in the external 
environments of the state caused a transformation of the state and its institutions, which is 
rather different from a decline of the state (Mann, 1997; Sorensen, 2004). The main role of 
political institutions in the process of governing was seen as that of defining collective 
interests and to serve as a “hub”, coordinating the actions of state and non-state actors (Pierre 
and Peters, 2000). 
As this very brief analysis of institutional analysis and governance research 
shows, these research fields complement each other rather compete. If institutional analysis 
uncovers the significance of structure and norms in political life, the governance approach 
adds attention to process and agency to the table. For the present analysis, the key aspect of 
governance is that it challenges us to rethink the role of political institutions in the process of 
governing. To put this slightly differently, the core questions in this research are: what is the 
role of government in governance? What causes this role to change? What are the main 
challenges to these institutions, and how capable are they of transforming themselves to meet 
new demands? 
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These are precisely the questions this article is concerned with. The challenge to 
rethink the role of political institutions in the context of emerging governance arrangements is 
at the heart of this article, to reiterate its two themes: to what extent can the institutions of 
government adapt to the challenges of governance, and to what extent can emergent models of 
governance provide some degree of democratic input and accountability? Let us now address 
these two themes in more detail. 
 
Political institutions in the new governance 
 
An assessment of institutional change in order to meet the complex challenge of governance 
needs to differentiate between administrative and representative institutions. 
 
The public administration. The issue of governance reform in the public bureaucracy is a 
key issue in public administration research. As Kettl (2002:xi) suggests, there is “an emerging 
gap” between the structures and functions of government and the process through which 
government achieves its goals. Previously, government, through hierarchical systems of 
administration, was in control over service delivery and policy implementation. Over the past 
couple of decades much of that has been done in concert with non-governmental actors. This 
change has disrupted the logic of hierarchy, control and accountability. 
 The public bureaucracy has been the target of massive management reform. Part 
of that reform has been structural, such as the creation of autonomous operative agencies in 
many countries (Pollitt and Talbot, 2003) or the “hiving off” of specific services to the private 
sector through privatization or contracting out. Other parts of the reform have targeted the 
modus operandi of the bureaucracy. Managing NPM-style bureaucracies has entailed new 
tasks (purchasing, managing contracts, performance measurement, and so on) that have 
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required the development of new skills and knowledge (see Halligan, forthcoming; Pollitt and 
Bouckaert, 2004). 
NPM created a momentum of administrative reform and change in the public 
service that governance reform seems to have capitalized on. The frontline of the public sector 
is today much more open towards networks and key players in its external environment than it 
was 10-15 years ago. It appears as if not only academics but practitioners too have taken 
Rhodes’ account of powerful networks to heart; public sector institutions today themselves 
create networks with actors in their environment as instruments of gathering information, 
bargaining, persuasion, collaboration, and policy implementation (Fell, 2008). This blurring 
of the border between the public sector and its environment has gone even further at the local 
government level in many countries where partnerships, joint ventures and contracting out 
social services have a long tradition. 
 Thus, the public administration has witnessed extensive, if not profound, reform 
during the past two decades, some of it in the guise of NPM reform and some of it to make the 
bureaucracy better geared to engage in different forms of collaborative strategies of 
governance. These developments have not gone unnoticed by those who caution against  
compromising the institutional integrity or the “publicness” of the public administration 
(Frederickson, 2007; Kettl, 2002; Peters, 2008a; Pierre and Painter, forthcoming; Suleiman, 
2003). However, governance reform, and even more so NPM reform, insists that the public 
bureaucracy opens up to its external environment. Even in those areas of the public sector 
where legal authority is exercised and which would appear to be reserved for public sector 
ethos and norms, there is today a tendency to bring in the private sector by using consultants 
or contracting out elements of deliberation and analysis. Governance reform may be helpful in 
finding efficient strategies of policy implementation in a complex environment, but engaging 
that environment requires the bureaucracy to allow for lower-level discretion and some degree 
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of openness. Partnerships and networks are two-way streets and public institutions cannot 
expect to find much willingness to share resources among actors in its environment unless it 
offers some of that willingness itself.  
 
Representative institutions. If there thus has been extensive, almost continuous reform in the 
public bureaucracy for the past two decades or so, we find almost exactly the opposite pattern 
with the representative institutions of government. Certainly, government departments are 
frequently reorganized along with changing political priorities, but the key function of 
departments and its execution remains almost identical to what it was 20 or 40 years ago. The 
core of the democratic system still exercises considerable political control through its budget, 
legislation and regulation. The budget process in many countries has been modernized and 
adapted to performance management and to the new institutional landscape. In the EU 
member states, core political institutions have been reorganized as a response to the 
exchanges with EU institutions and the harmonization of legislation and regulation. 
Overall, central government reform in many countries seems to follow two 
seemingly inconsistent paths of devolution and presidentialization. One “trajectory of reform” 
(Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2004) has been to devolve authority to executive agencies, to regions 
and in many national contexts also to local government. This process has been driven a notion 
that centre should not be involved in the operative side of governing and administration but 
rather coordinate and regulate from a distance. This philosophy can be traced back to NPM 
but also to the EU’s notion of empowering member state regions. 
The other reform process has been a concentration of political power to the top 
executive leadership (Helms, 2005; Poguntke and Webb, 2005). These parallel processes 
would at first glance appear to contradict each other. The explanation to the paradox seems to 
be that there is a concentration to the political executive of those powers and capabilities that 
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are still controlled by the centre. It is also clear that devolution and presidentialization both 
undercut the position of representative institutions. Institutional reform, either in a structural 
or a procedural sense, thus seems to take place everywhere except in the traditional 
institutions of political representation. 
Let us now turn to the emergent governance instrument to see to what extent 
they can offer any alternative opportunities for citizens to articulate their political preferences 
or hold political leaders to account. 
 
Emergent alternatives to traditional democracy 
 
This section will briefly review four governance models that have gained attention in the 
governance debate; network governance, stakeholderism, user boards and political input and 
accountability through market-based public service delivery. 
 
Network governance. We mentioned earlier networks as almost a defining feature of the 
“new governance” (Rhodes, 1997; Sorensen and Torfing, 2007). Networks are usually 
informal groups of actors sharing an interest in a specific set of issues. Networks can also be 
instruments of territorial mobilization. Their attractiveness stems from the informal 
organization, the absence of hierarchy and their closeness to the issues to be resolved.  
 In terms of their composition, networks can be exclusive or inclusive. Exclusive 
networks are usually fairly organized, and membership is restricted. New members are 
admitted after deliberation among the existing members. The reason for such restricted 
membership is that the network wants to ensure that there is a high degree of homogeneity 
among the actors in terms of objectives and values. Inclusive networks, by comparison, want 
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to maximize their membership and allow essentially everyone who wants to join to enter the 
network. 
Both models have their strengths and weaknesses. The exclusive network model 
offers a high organizational capability and the homogeneity of the actors guarantees that there 
is little disagreement regarding objectives and strategies. The inclusive network model can 
help mobilize a community or a neighbourhood and can present impressive membership 
figures. However, those networks are diverse in terms of objectives and members and since 
networks rarely have a formalized process of conflict resolution there is some risk that the 
network will not be able to accomplish very much.  
Is network governance a viable alternative to traditional democratic 
government? There are several democratic problems associated with network governance. 
One such problem, as Mette Kjaer (2004:55) argues, “is that networks usually only serve 
some interests, and not the aggregated interest; the common will”. Whether inclusive or 
exclusive, networks cater only to the interests of their members and not to those of the larger 
polity. An additional problem is the transparency of networks. These organizations may be 
internally open but offer very little transparency to those outside the network. Broadly 
speaking, the informality that characterizes most networks suggests that although they might 
cater to external interests and offer some degree of transparency there is no guarantee that 
they will. Democracy as an option is not a very satisfactory arrangement if we want networks 
to assume a larger role in democratic governance. The key problem is that democracy requires 
some degree of formality to ensure equal say, conflict resolution and accountability, yet the 
founding principle of most networks is their informality. 
 
Stakeholderism. If network governance is a nebulous concept, stakeholderism is somewhat 
easier to pin down. The idea here is that actors with an interest, a stake, in public services 
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should have an input on the management and operations of that service. The notion of 
stakeholder has its roots in private management theory and thus originated in the corporate 
sector as related to shareholder. The political meaning of stakeholder could include citizens, 
interest groups or private businesses—essentially all those who have an interest in, or are 
associated with a particular public service (Ackerman and Alstott, 1999). Stakeholderism thus 
suggests that those who use, or are potential users, of a service should have a privileged 
influence on that service but also that they have some degree of responsibility for the service.  
 Stakeholder arrangements are quite common. Private businesses often have 
privileged access to local politicians and managers. University boards in many countries are 
made up of representatives for societal actors with an interest in higher education. State-
owned corporations, too, tend to place stakeholders on their boards. The philosophy 
sustaining the stakeholder model is that those with an interest in a public service are also more 
likely to be involved and concerned about the development of that service than non-users. 
To what extent a governance arrangement is a stakeholder model depends 
ultimately on how stakeholder is defined. That issue puts the finger on one of the core 
problems of stakeholderism. If we use higher education as an example, how do we define who 
is a stakeholder and who is not? Clearly, students and staff are stakeholders, but so are the 
local business community, many NGOs and, indeed, the taxpayers. Who, to beg the question, 
does not have a direct or indirect stake in higher education? If we are to take the notion of 
life-long learning seriously, that would define much of the adult population as stakeholders in 
higher education. Furthermore, university boards (at least in public universities) allocate 
public funds and there is a strong need for public control and accountability, a requirement 
that might put stakeholders at odds with other actors in university management. Finally, 
stakeholderism has the problem of granting one group of actors a privileged position vis-à-vis 
others and thus disaggregating the polity. As a more general alternative to conventional 
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democracy, stakeholderism does not offer the inclusive opportunities for involvement that we 
associate with democracy. This also means that popular input and accountability becomes 
limited and selective. 
 
User boards. A more elaborated version of stakeholderism is the user board model. These 
boards, whose status in management can range from advisory boards to decision-making 
structures, are made up of those who utilize a public service. User boards are rather common 
the Scandinavian countries, e.g. in primary education, care of the elderly, child-care facilities 
and hospitals (see Jarl, 2005). As governance instruments they thus share several features with 
the stakeholder model, but they are more institutionalized than most stakeholder 
arrangements. By identifying users as participants they also escape the tricky problem of 
defining stakeholders. 
 As is the case with stakeholderism, user boards tend to create a gap between 
those who use a service and the rest of those who provide the financial resources for it. Again, 
disaggregating the polity and give one group a privileged governance position does not rhyme 
with traditional democratic values. That said, users clearly have a stake in the service they 
use, and as a governance instrument it is in many logical to exploit that concern and 
involvement. 
 A key issue is the degree of influence given to the user boards and how that 
influence compares to that of the traditional institutions that make decisions concerning the 
public service in question. If the user boards are given authority to make decisions that 
essentially overrule political decisions there will be complex problems of accountability. If, 
on the other hand, user boards are not given any real influence over the public service, users 
may feel that they are being taken hostage and that their presence in the public management 
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process is merely symbolic. Thus, either way there will be problems of balancing the interest 
of users against the authority of the political board managing the public service.  
 
Market-based models of service delivery as a governance instrument. The early 
management reform advocates saw the creation of customer-choice models in public service 
delivery as a key element of reform (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992). Choice would help adapt 
public service to individual needs and increase customer satisfaction. The choice system 
would also give customers an instant input on public service. Instead of trying to bring about 
change through a complex and slow political process, the choice model was seen as an 
instrument to allow customers to voice their preferences and target it directly at service 
providers. By the same token, customer choice was seen as a new and far more efficient 
system of accountability; users of services, through their choices, identified those service 
providers who delivered good services and not so good services. Thus, here was a model of 
every-day democracy; service users could influence public service instantly, directly and 
continuously instead of only on Election Day. 
Does this model of service delivery offer democratic input? It certainly offers 
input in terms of service provision but it is a very narrow and selective input confined to very 
specific issues. We would expect democratic input to be both broader in terms of the range of 
issues it covers and also to be not just an articulation of individual preferences but input and 
engagement in the public discourse on a wider range of political matters as well. 
Accountability, too, is problematic; customer choice offers a type of accountability but it is 
accountability of performance, not of procedure. In traditional democracy, procedure and 
performance are both subject to control and accountability. Thus, for all its virtues customer 
choice models are not a viable substitute for traditional models of democracy; it is at best a 
supplement to the democratic process. 
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The picture is more complex, however. A growing body of research suggests 
that political legitimacy is increasingly created not at the input side of the political system, i.e. 
through representative institutions, but rather at the output side where citizens engage the 
public service (see Peters, 2008b; Scharpf, 1999). This is believed to be particularly the case 
where there is democratic deficit in governance, as is said to be the case in the EU. One might 
argue that if this is the case, i.e. that preference articulation and some degree of input as well 
as the creation of legitimacy all takes place as citizens engage the public service and not so 
much when they interact with representative institutions, maybe the problem of a rigid 
representative system is not such a big problem. The key point here is that representation and 
administration are intertwined processes where one cannot replace the other. 
To sum up the discussion so far, a common denominator among the emergent 
models of governance and administration is that they cater more objectives of efficiency and 
flexibility than to ensuring democracy and accountability. They tend to perceive democracy 
and involvement in governance as a continuous process and not an activity confined to 
general elections. In that respect, they can serve the benevolent purpose of engaging citizens 
in public affairs. The problem with these models, however, is that neither of them offers an 
alternative to traditional models of popular preference formation and articulation, political 
representation and accountability. To be sure, the “new governance” or NPM schools of 
administrative reform have not presented any alternative representative structures or processes 
to replace the traditional mechanisms of political and democratic representation. The 
advocates of governance and management reform insist that market-based service delivery 
offers clients instant input and accountability through customer choice. It does, but it is a 
different kind of input and accountability than the ones we usually associate with democratic 
government. 
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Democracy Old and New? 
 
Many western democracies are currently implementing governance reform and administrative 
reform without much reflection of its broader democratic ramifications. For instance, 
empowering citizens as customers serves some purposes in administrative reform although the 
consistency of that reform with the traditional system of democracy was not seriously 
assessed. If there is anything to be learned from recent administrative and governance reform, 
it should be that democracy and administration are integrated processes where reform in one 
process will impact the other. While there have been extensive reform in the sphere of 
administration—including reform that redefines the relationship between the administration 
and the citizen—we have seen very little reform indeed in the sphere of democracy. The basic 
tension between performance and representation—or, more broadly, between efficiency and 
democracy—has not been resolved. As a result, there is now a growing disjuncture in the 
system of government between the institutions of representation and those of administration. 
Traditionally, citizens elect politicians to govern. Politicians delegate some of their 
democratic authority to the public administration, but “holding public administration 
accountable for that delegation…is the keystone of democratic accountability” (Kettl, 
2002:x). 
As we have seen, the search for new forms of governance has created 
collaborative, frequently informal, strategies and institutions with key actors and interests in 
the political institution’s environment to achieve goals related to policy implementation and 
service delivery. At the same time, however, those institutions remain the critical channels 
between electors and elected. Emergent models of governance and New Public Management-
type of public service production expect elected officials to surrender much of their control to 
“managers” in order to separate “policy” from “operations”.  
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How does that arrangement fit with the traditional model of democratic, 
representative and accountable government? A number of scholars have pointed at the 
changing character of political accountability in the wake of public management reform 
(Aucoin and Heintzman, 2000; Barberis, 1998; Mulgan, 2000; Polidano, 1997; Thomas, 
1998). These observers are not alien to the introduction of performance-related accountability 
or accountability exercised by citizens as “customers” through market choice in public service 
delivery. However, several raise questions about what these changes mean to the traditional 
process of political and administrative accountability. The good news, some might say, is that 
in a public administration system where many key decisions are made by autonomous 
managers, not politicians, it makes sense to move accountability closer to service production 
and away from elected officials whose role consists mainly of setting long-term goals and 
objectives. 
The bad news, other would object, is that at the end of the day we need to 
consider the fact that public administration is a creature of the state and as such a pillar of 
democratic governance. Market-based models of public service and accountability empowers 
the customer to voice preferences among service providers but it provides no aggregation of 
preferences, no discourse on political objectives, no deliberation and debate, and no sense of 
the collective nature of political projects. It allows the customer to choose among a pre-
defined set of service providers but it does not allow the citizen to question the political 
priorities concerning those services relative to other political commitments. 
The critique against these elements of NPM has been quite pointed. Ezra 
Suleiman (2003:2) recently asked, “democratic societies are based on legitimacy, which itself 
is largely based on effectiveness. How can governments preserve their legitimacy if they deny 
themselves the means of being effective?” To Suleiman, recent administrative reform has not 
just changed the nature of the public administration—it has been tinkering with a cornerstone 
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of democratic government. The public bureaucracy is a creature of the state hence changing 
the structure or modus operandi of the bureaucracy is a political project. What is ultimately at 
stake is the “publicness” of the public administration: “as government loses control over 
functions considered to be public, it may lose the ability to effectively direct the society; it 
may lose the steering ability that constitutes the root of what we call government” (Peters, 
2008a:379). “Publicness” and legitimacy are closely related—a great del of the legitimacy of 
the public service is derived from its adherence to legality and democratic accountability—
and tampering with the “publicness” of public administration will impact its legitimacy. 
 
Concluding discussion 
 
Public administration is granted authority through delegation from elected politicians. The 
accountability of that delegation is integral to democratic accountability. NPM reform and to 
some extent the introduction of new governance arrangements have complicated that 
accountability. As a result, there is today a growing tension between the goals of democracy 
and efficiency in the administrative system in many countries. 
 While there has been extensive reform implemented to enhance the efficiency of 
the public bureaucracy, very little has been achieved in the area of modernizing the practice of 
democracy. Emergent governance arrangements as networks, stakeholder arrangements, user 
boards or market-based models of customer choice empower the customers of public services. 
However, it is an empowerment that at the same time disaggregates the polity. Citizens are 
redefined as customers with little concern for political discourse or involvement in public 
affairs. For such involvement, the citizen is referred to traditional models of political 
representation.  
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 Just as politicians and bureaucrats in the Antipodes are now busy “rebalancing” 
their systems to restore the role of the public administration in democratic governance, so 
should constitutional architects in several other national contexts critically assess the 
ramifications of administrative reform on the democratic governance. We do, as the Chinese 
saying goes, live in interesting times.  
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i Governance research today displays a rather wide array of models and perspectives, ranging from network 
analyses (Sorensen and Torfing, 2007) via governance models based in social complexity (Kickert 1997; Kickert 
et al., 1999; Kooiman, 1993, 2003; Pierre and Peters, 2005) towards studies of governance from a more state-
centric perspective (Pierre and Peters, 2000). Governance research departs from the growing complexity of 
society which makes traditional models of governing less efficient and propels collaborative arrangements of 
governing and service delivery (Ansell and Gash, 2007). 
